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The world of today can look back at some fifty years of 
widespread and virtually continuous political revolution. Prob­
ably more governments have come into being, passed through 
drastic change, or ceased to exist than in any comparable period 
in history. Certainly a larger proportion of the world’s popula­
tion has been involved in and has been aware of these upheavals 
than was ever the case in earlier days. It is the political pheno­
menon of the twentieth century, the visible wind of revolution, 
stirring in many continents.
Revolutionary warfare
These changes in regime have been brought about, in the 
main, by a new form of warfare, now widely termed revolu­
tionary warfare. This new form of warfare, that is sympto­
matic of our age, has crystallised very rapidly since the end 
of World War II. It differs fundamentally from the wars of the 
past in that victory does not come from the clash of two armies 
on a field of battle. Military operations, as combat actions 
carried out against opposing forces are, in fact, of limited im­
portance and are never the total conflict. Instead, revolutionary 
wars are conducted as a carefully co-ordinated system of actions, 
political, economic, administrative, psychological, police and 
military. The aim of the insurgent is to subvert and overthrow 
the established regime and to replace it with another. He will 
use any means to attain his objective, including ruthless force. 
His prim ary task is to gain the support of the people. This 
he sets out to achieve by establishing a small clandestine orga­
nisation whose role is to impose its will upon the population, 
and get its support or the support of a significant portion of 
it. The next step is to inspire a revolutionary state of mind in 
as many of the population as possible — to kindle the torch 
of war. Without the consent and active aid of the people 
the guerilla would be merely a bandit and could not long 
survive.
On the other hand victory can be obtained by a govern­
m ent only by retaining and, if tem porarily lost, by recapturing
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the support of the masses, and by the complete destruction 
of the organisation and the eradication of its influence upon 
the people.
During the past twenty-five years numerous revolutionary 
wars have been waged throughout the world. These include 
China, Malaya, the Philippines, Greece, Cyprus, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Angola, Vietnam, etc., etc. Most, but not all of them, 
have been Communist inspired. In all of them propaganda, 
terrorism  and guerillas have been the insurgent’s main weapons. 
On January 6, 1961, Krushchev made his notorious speech in 
which he announced that the Soviets would lend their sup­
port to revolutionary wars within the nations of the free world. 
This made a m atter of public record a policy which the Soviet 
Union had long been following. Red China, too, has entered 
the field of aggressive predatory Communism and her leader 
Mao-Tse-Tung is among the most successful proponents of this 
form of warfare in the world — and possibly the most specta­
cularly successful. The author feels that the reason why Com­
munists have been able to exercise such a dynamic influence in 
m any'revolutionary wars is that Communist parties possess 
not only a wide and varied experience of revolutionary wars 
but deep-rooted traditions of revolution which date back into 
history. One result of this is that they have developed a 
strategy to which the West has not yet developed an entirely 
adequate response.
It is im portant to understand the methods both the USSR 
and Communist China use to achieve their aims, and why the 
revolutionary warfare they propound seems so appealing and 
promising for them. Even the most cursory look at the appealing 
consequences of an all-out thermo-nuclear conflict makes it 
clear that there can be no ultimate winner, and this conclu­
sion is just as evident in Moscow and Peking as in the West. 
The forward momentum called for by Communism’s creed of 
world domination must, therefore, be assured by some lesser 
form of conflict; preferably by the form least likely to lead 
to escalation into an unprofitable and almost certainly dis­
astrous holocaust. Inexpensive, easily fomented and extremely 
difficult to counteract, revolutionary warfare has become one 
of the most efficient weapons in the Communist arsenal. It 
is now a key element in the world wide drive for power and 
domination, and this southern tip of Africa of ours is one
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of their avowed targets. Indeed Southern Africa has had ample 
evidence of internal revolutionary activity in recent years and 
should anticipate even more frequent, more widespread and 
more efficient attempts.
Revolutionary warfare must be recognised for what it 
really is — aggression from outside. The first phase, political 
subversion and the following phase, armed insurrection are 
equally to be seen in this light, as being aggression from out­
side. Revolutionary warfare is a subversive and sinister process, 
a sort of “plague of dragons teeth, sown and nourished in 
the soil of confusion, social dissension, economic disruptions, 
etc., causing armed fanatics to spring up where peaceful 
peasants worked”.
The great majority of revolutionary wars have been won 
by the insurgents. In only one have the insurgents been com­
pletely defeated — Malaya. (Two, if the Mau Mau troubles in 
Kenya are considered to have been a revolutionary war). In 
others there have been partial successes by government forces, 
but these have been of a tem porary nature only. Vietnam is an 
example of this. In some revolutionary wars the military 
campaigns have been won by government troops or nearly 
so, but the wars have finally been lost politically. Algeria is a 
classic example of this. A Frenchman has said about this war 
that they lost with bad politics and administration and worse 
propaganda what they had won with good fighting.
Revolutionary war has its own special rules or principles, 
different from those of conventional war. Whereas in con­
ventional war the principles of war hold equally true for both 
sides, in revolutionary war most of the rules applicable to 
one side do not work for the other. There are two distinct 
types of warfare — insurgency and counter-insurgency. In­
surgency, of which guerilla war is a part, is the agency of 
radical social or political change. Counter-insurgency is a 
form of counter-revolution, the process by which revolution 
is resisted. Many books and treatises on revolutionary war are 
misleading. For instance, what Mao Tse-Tung calls the “rules 
of revolutionary war” are, in fact, those of a revolutionary 
side. The one who directs a war against a revolutionary move­
ment will not find in Mao, Chê Guevara or many other revo­
lutionary writers the answers to his problems. He will, indeed, 
find useful information on how the insurgent acts, and he may
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perhaps infer the answers he is looking for, but nowhere there 
will he find them explicitly stated. Fortunately there is an 
increasing volume of literature for the counter-insurgent. 
Among the best books that have been written so far, in the 
author’s opinion, are those by Frenchmen — paradoxically 
enough, as they lost both their revolutionary wars — Indo­
china and Algeria. The British who are the only people to 
have won against insurgents have been typically reticent 
about the reasons for their success. Only recently have they 
published some first-rate literature on the subject e.g. Sir 
Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency. Only 
recently, too, have the British Joint Chiefs of Staff laid down a 
definite policy to be followed by their armed forces in coun­
ter-insurgency. Until now they stated to enunciate formulae, to 
dogmatise about counter-insurgency would be dangerous. In­
genuity, inspiration, expediency, flexibility, resolution and 
boldness were their golden rules.
While one or two of the revolutionary wars of the last 
quarter century had some similarities, no two such wars have 
been identical. Nevertheless there have been certain factors 
common to them all. From the point of view of the insurgents 
perhaps the basic ingredients of successful revolution are:
a popular cause;
trained, efficient and dedicated leadership;
time to develop;
support of the population;
a population with a need, a determination and an ability, 
to wage a prolonged struggle;
outside support;
a firm  base or sanctuary.
The basic principles to be applied, on the other hand, by 
a government in power have formed the subject of consider­
able research and study and are now almost completely cry­
stallised.
I propose now to outline what I consider is the nature of 
revolutionary warfare.
A political war
„A revolutionary war is 20 per cent m ilitary action and
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80 per cent political” — Colonel David Galula (French
Army).
The failure to recognise this is bound to lead ultimately 
to failure in countering and defeating the insurgent.
The basic motive behind revolution is to eliminate the old 
political order and establish a new government more desirable 
to the revolutionary rulers and the people whom they persuade 
to side with them. The basic tenet of the exercise of political 
power is that there is always an active minority for the cause, 
an uncommitted majority and an active minority against the 
cause. For ultimate victory it is necessary to obtain the sup­
port of the neutral or uncommitted majority. The objective for 
both sides in a revolutionary war is, thus, the population itself. 
The operations designed to win the population over for the 
insurgents, or to keep it a t least submissive to the dictates of 
the government, is essentially of a political nature. Conse­
quently political action remains param ount throughout the war. 
That the political power is the undisputed boss is a m atter of 
both principle and practicality. What is a t stake is the country’s 
political regime, and to defend it is a political affair. Even if 
this requires m ilitary action, the action is constantly directed 
towards the political goal. Essential though it is, the military 
action is secondary to the political one, its prim ary purpose 
being to afford the political power enough freedom to work 
safely with the population.
“The Times” (of London) of 31 July 1963 stated the 
following about the United States Special W arfare Centre: 
“The whole emphasis of training at Fort Bragg is on the reali­
sation, frustrating as it may be to a great m ilitary power, that 
armed force alone is virtually powerless against organised 
guerilla troops in revolutionary war.”
Yet despite this, in South Vietnam today the United States 
still seems to place too much emphasis on conventional mili­
tary power and, even now that it is almost too late, does not 
seem to grasp the param ount importance of the political factor 
in revolutionary warfare. They have so fa r failed to fashion 
a workable programme for gaining popular support for the 
South Vietnamese government. The position was succinctly 
described by a Japanese reporter recently who said that “the 
South Vietnamese and the Americans understand the political
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nature of the war in theory, but not in practice” . The longer 
this awareness is absent the harder will it be to win. But it must 
be recognised that it is not enough for the government to set 
political goals, to determine how much m ilitary force is ap­
plicable, or what civil administration and propaganda methods 
will be adopted: politics and the administration of the govern­
m ent’s policies become an active and a primary instrum ent of 
operations. And so intricate is the interplay between it and 
military actions that they cannot be tidily separated. On the 
contrary, every military and administrative move has to be 
weighed with regard to their political effects and vice versa.
More than armed forces
The armed forces are but one of the many instruments 
in the hands of the government. It is the function of the 
political power to harness the non-military instruments, to 
see that appropriations come at the right time to consolidate 
the military work, that political and social reforms follow 
through, etc. Military tactics and hardware are all well and 
good, but they are really quite useless if the government has 
lost the confidence of the people among whom it is fighting. 
And by the time their confidence has been lost more armed 
force will cause the population to become more antagonistic. 
It is imperative that political and military leaders and senior 
civil servants in all government departm ents should learn that 
revolutionary warfare cannot be left to happy improvisation 
and military technology. Most measures essential to forestall 
or quell insurgency must be taken by the civil departm ents 
of the government.
Although the armed forces and the police are there to 
fight against insurgency, just as they are there to defend the 
country against conventional attack, they are neither organised 
nor equipped to combat the causes of revolutionary wars. To 
recognise that counter-insurgency is a total war within the 
country is implicitly to recognise that the armed forces and 
the police can no longer handle more than a part of it. The 
inescapable conclusion is that the overall responsibility rests 
with the civilian power at every possible level.
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The population
The objective for both sides, in a revolutionary war is 
to gain the support of the mass of the population, their ap­
proval, sympathy and active participation. A government must 
get the majority of the population on its side and this includes 
the indigenous population, or recapture their support if it has 
been lost. The insurgent has to gain control of the people by 
converting to his cause sufficient of them to control the rest.
When a revolutionary situation or a potential revolutionary 
situation already exists, it means that the insurgents have al­
ready gained a head start; the population being their objective 
too. But it must be remembered that for either side, support 
from the population is conditional on the confidence of the 
population being retained.
Typical of the insurgents’ methods of gaining the support of 
the people are a dynamic cause, threats, terrorism  and promises
— because the insurgents have not yet acquired any respon­
sibility for government, these promises may be quite impos­
sible of fulfilment. But it is im portant to realise that adequate 
support for a guerilla movement does not necessarily mean 
the enthusiastic, voluntary backing of a large majority of the 
population. Indeed, among developing peoples the majority 
has relatively little understanding of any but the most per­
sonal and immediate political issues, and many would have 
relatively little feeling one way or the other even if they did 
understand them. The active participation of a small number 
of people and the general apathy of the majority often provide 
all the popular support necessary to make a successful revo­
lution.
The support of the population for a government is gained 
through the favourable minority. The strategic problem of a 
government may be defined as follows: “To find the favourable 
minority and to organise it in order to mobilise the rest of 
the population against the insurgent minority” .
Every operation, whether in the military field or in the 
political, social, economic or psychological fields m ust be 
geared to this end. It is necessary to show that the government’s 
cause is better and its strength and ability greater than the 
insurgents’. This underlines the necessity for the government to 
come out with an acceptable counter-cause.
142
Once the insurgent has established his hold over the popu­
lation, the active minority that was hostile to him becomes 
invisible. Some have been eliminated physically, thereby provid­
ing an example to the others; others have escaped; most have 
been intimidated into hiding their true feelings and have thus 
melted into the majority of the population; a few are even 
making a show of their support for the insurgency. The bulk 
of the population, watched by the active supporters of the 
insurgency, lives under the threat of denunciation to the poli­
tical cells and of prompt punishment by the insurgents. The 
minority, hostile to the insurgent, will not and cannot emerge 
as long as the th reat has not been lifted, the emerging govern­
ment supporters will not be able to rally the bulk of the popula­
tion as long as the population is not convinced that the govern­
ment has the will, the means and the ability to win.
Effective measures
Five im portant points are:
□  Effective political action on the population must be pre­
ceded by police and/or military operations against the 
guerilla units and the insurgent political organisations.
□  Political, social, economic and other reforms, however 
popular and necessary they might be, are inoperative when 
offered while the insurgent still controls the population.
□  The reigning government needs a convincing success as 
early as possible in order to demonstrate that it has the 
will, the means and the ability to win.
□  The government must advertise its successes as widely 
as it is able in order to bring them to the minds and 
consciousness of the people whose confidence they must 
bolster.
□  The government cannot safely enter into negotiations ex­
cept from a position of strength or its potential supporters 
will flock to the insurgents’ side.
It would be a mistake to believe that a government cannot 
get the population’s support unless it concedes political reforms. 
There are means of keeping the population submissive to 
government dictates. However unpopular the government may 
be, if it is sufficiently strong-willed and powerful and if it
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can rely on a small but active core of supporters who remain 
loyal to it because they would lose everything including their 
lives if the insurgent wins, it can maintain itself in power. It 
may very well withdraw whatever benefits the population 
receives from the mere existence of its regime — a measure of 
law and order, a more-or-less running economy, functioning 
public works and services, etc., and restore them gradually 
as a reward for the population’s co-operation. It may, for in­
stance, ration food and see that only those who co-operate 
receive ration cards. It may, at the same time, utilise to the 
utmost those who are willing to support the government active­
ly, giving them increased privileges and power, and ruling 
through them, however disliked they may be. This is the way 
the Kadar regime in Hungary and others no doubt, keep them ­
selves in power. But such a dictatorial policy of force could 
bring, at best, a precarious return  to the ‘status ante quo’, of 
perpetual tension, not a lasting peace.
Outside assistance
Popular uprisings or revolutions rarely succeed without 
outside assistance.
Insurrection takes on another dimension when the insur­
gents are encouraged and supported by the government of an­
other State. It has been suggested that had the Chinese Com­
munists in Malaya not been cut off from the support and ma­
terial assistance of China herself, the British may easily have 
found themselves in the same position in Malaya in which the 
Americans find themselves in Vietnam today.
Inciting rebellion has become a technique of foreign policy 
and a form of unconventional international aggression. Since 
this sort of unacknowledged and irregular attack is not aggres­
sion in the classical sense of the word, it is difficult to demon­
strate to international tribunals and to the world at large that 
aggression is indeed taking place, and as a result effective 
forms of defence and retaliation are hard to determine and 
carry out without world opinion coming down hard against 
a government taking strong action against those who would 
overthrow it. This is unconventional warfare as we are seeing 
it waged today.
Attacks of this sort are certainly nothing new in the world,
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for stirring up trouble in neighbouring states is an ancient 
political pastime. Encouraging rebellion and civil war by sup­
porting and guiding the disaffected has always been a temp­
tingly easy way of making trouble and gaining political objec­
tives. For example, the government of France complicated and 
enlivened British politics for well over a century by supporting 
the Stuart claims to the British crown, and that policy was not 
wholly different in its tactics and objectives from the infinitely 
more extensive efforts that the communist leaders are pursuing 
throughout the world today.
Conventional warfare to follow
Propaganda, terrorism and guerillas constitute only one 
stage of modern warfare, designed to create a situation favour­
able to the build-up of conventional forces for the purpose, 
eventually, of confronting government forces on the battlefield, 
and defeating them.
In China and at Dien Bien Phu guerillas were used to 
supplement conventional forces, which is their classical em­
ployment in international war and which, according to Mao 
Tse-Tung, is their proper employment in revolutionary war, 
i.e. they must be followed up by conventional forces. However, 
only Mao Tse-Tung in China and General Giap in French Indo­
china have used guerillas in this way in revolutionary warfare. 
In view of the increasing influence being created by Red China 
throughout the world, it is reasonable to expect that future 
revolutionary wars will be followed by conventional forces in 
typically Mao Tse-Tung campaigns. For this reason it is impe­
rative that a government’s conventional warfare potential be 
not dissipated for counter-insurgency operations. They must 
remain in being. Equally important is it that counter-insurgency 
forces be capable quickly of resuming the conventional role 
and their commanders of applying the appropriate strategy. 
This latter is so because conventional war ultimately hinges 
on the ability to destroy the enemy’s main armed forces in 
pitched battle whereas in revolutionary war this is not so. 
This stark fact is not easily grasped by civilian leaders. Indeed, 
even some m ilitary leaders, and Orde Wingate foremost among 
them, seem to suffer from the same strategic astigmatism, 
possibly caused by their penchant for and skill in guerilla-type 
operations.
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If a country’s manpower is not enough for both counter­
insurgency and conventional commitments, then at least the 
fire power of the conventional forces must be increased to 
right the imbalance.
Time, patience and all other resources
Time is a weapon of the insurgents. Communists and other 
insurgents recognise that at the beginning of a revolutionary 
war the balance of forces is likely to be in favour of the 
government they intend to overthrow. The process of changing 
this balance may be long and difficult. They expect no great 
success until the support of the population has been effec­
tively won. They stress this fact by preparing their cadres for 
a protracted war, thus forestalling any disillusionment that may 
later occur in their forces.
More than anything it must be realised that to communist- 
inspired revolutionaries time is unimportant. The communist 
doctrine states that revolution is perpetual. Revolutionary war, 
more often than not is war of attrition. This is where guerillas 
dem onstrate their enormous power. A successful insurgency 
operation takes a long time to complete. Insurgents recognise 
this; and their only concern with time is that they should 
have enough to complete their operations. Mao Tse-Tung be­
lieves that time at the insurgent’s disposal is in direct propor­
tion to the space in which he can operate. He does not con­
centrate on the problem of ending a war quickly. His problem 
is to keep it going. He believes also that space in Africa could 
be made to yield time, and time, revolutionary organisations, 
political cohesion and victory — for Communism. The com­
munists have a monopoly of patience. The anti-communist front 
is committed to quick victory and therefore cannot and will 
not underwrite a long drawn-out war — until the government 
and the people are made alive to the necessity to face up to 
this unpleasant prospect. Government forces must recognise 
that their counter-insurgency programme will be long drawn out.
Revolutionary war will tax to the utm ost the full resources 
and patience of any state. Simon Bolivar wrote: “It is a terrible 
truth that it costs more strength to maintain freedom than to 
endure the weight of tyranny” . The operations needed to re ­
lieve the population from the insurgents’ th reat or domination
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and to convince it that the government will ultimately win, are 
necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration. They 
require an exorbitant concentration of effort, resources and 
personnel. This invariably means that operations (military, 
political, economic, administrative, etc.) have to be applied 
successively area by area. Staying power is an attribute that is 
vital for eventual government success. Operations in Malaya 
took 12 years and Algeria 8 years to be concluded.
* *  *
The very nature of revolutionary warfare is based on the 
following considerations: the political aspect is the dominant 
factor; the support of the local population must be obtained; 
it is a type of external aggression; the ultimate aim is to engage 
and overpower the government forces by means of conventional 
warfare; time is a factor in favour of the insurgents; counter­
insurgency requires a sustained effort on the part of the 
government.
The South African armed forces are not unaware of the 
seriousness of the threat against our country. We are well 
prepared and we shall overcome.
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